Telegram-Android/TMessagesProj/jni/boringssl/crypto/evp/pbkdf.c

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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include "../internal.h"
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int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *password, size_t password_len,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, unsigned iterations,
const EVP_MD *digest, size_t key_len, uint8_t *out_key) {
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// See RFC 8018, section 5.2.
int ret = 0;
size_t md_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
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uint32_t i = 1;
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HMAC_CTX hctx;
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, password, password_len, digest, NULL)) {
goto err;
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}
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while (key_len > 0) {
size_t todo = md_len;
if (todo > key_len) {
todo = key_len;
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}
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uint8_t i_buf[4];
i_buf[0] = (uint8_t)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
i_buf[1] = (uint8_t)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
i_buf[2] = (uint8_t)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
i_buf[3] = (uint8_t)(i & 0xff);
// Compute U_1.
uint8_t digest_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, salt_len) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hctx, i_buf, 4) ||
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!HMAC_Final(&hctx, digest_tmp, NULL)) {
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goto err;
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_key, digest_tmp, todo);
for (unsigned j = 1; j < iterations; j++) {
// Compute the remaining U_* values and XOR.
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
!HMAC_Update(&hctx, digest_tmp, md_len) ||
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!HMAC_Final(&hctx, digest_tmp, NULL)) {
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goto err;
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}
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for (size_t k = 0; k < todo; k++) {
out_key[k] ^= digest_tmp[k];
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}
}
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key_len -= todo;
out_key += todo;
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i++;
}
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// RFC 8018 describes iterations (c) as being a "positive integer", so a
// value of 0 is an error.
//
// Unfortunately not all consumers of PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() check their return
// value, expecting it to succeed and unconditionally using |out_key|. As a
// precaution for such callsites in external code, the old behavior of
// iterations < 1 being treated as iterations == 1 is preserved, but
// additionally an error result is returned.
//
// TODO(eroman): Figure out how to remove this compatibility hack, or change
// the default to something more sensible like 2048.
if (iterations == 0) {
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
return ret;
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}
int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *password, size_t password_len,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
unsigned iterations, size_t key_len,
uint8_t *out_key) {
return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, password_len, salt, salt_len, iterations,
EVP_sha1(), key_len, out_key);
}