diff --git a/data/web/blogfork.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html b/data/web/blogfork.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html index 6fc56f310a..b4ba9e8c6c 100644 --- a/data/web/blogfork.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html +++ b/data/web/blogfork.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html @@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ MTProto v.1.0 is deprecated and is currently being phased…">
-

As of version 4.6, major Telegram clients are using MTProto 2.0. -MTProto v.1.0 is deprecated and is currently being phased out.

+

As of version 4.6, major Telegram clients are using MTProto 2.0.
MTProto v.1.0 is deprecated and is currently being phased out.

This article describes the basic layer of the MTProto protocol version 2.0 (Cloud chats, server-client encryption). The principal differences from version 1.0 (described here for reference) are as follows:

See also: MTProto 2.0: Secret Chats, end-to-end encryption

-

Protocol description

+

Protocol description

Before a message (or a multipart message) is transmitted over a network using a transport protocol, it is encrypted in a certain way, and an external header is added at the top of the message that consists of a 64-bit key identifier auth_key_id (that uniquely identifies an authorization key for the server as well as the user) and a 128-bit message key msg_key.

The authorization key auth_key combined with the message key msg_key define an actual 256-bit key aes_key and a 256-bit initialization vector aes_iv, which are used to encrypt the message using AES-256 encryption in infinite garble extension (IGE) mode. Note that the initial part of the message to be encrypted contains variable data (session, message ID, sequence number, server salt) that obviously influences the message key (and thus the AES key and iv). In MTProto 2.0, the message key is defined as the 128 middle bits of the SHA-256 of the message body (including session, message ID, padding, etc.) prepended by 32 bytes taken from the authorization key. In the older MTProto 1.0, the message key was computed as the lower 128 bits of SHA-1 of the message body, excluding the padding bytes.

Multipart messages are encrypted as a single message.

- MTProto server-client encryption, cloud chats + MTProto server-client encryption, cloud chats
+

Got questions about this setup? — Check out the Advanced FAQ!

-
Note 1
+
Note 1

Each plaintext message to be encrypted in MTProto always contains the following data to be checked upon decryption in order to make the system robust against known problems with the components:

-
Note 2
-

Telegram's End-to-end encrypted Secret Chats are using an additional layer of encryption on top of the described above. See Secret Chats, End-to-End encryption for details.

-

Terminology

-

Authorization Key (auth_key)

+
Note 2
+

Telegram's End-to-end encrypted Secret Chats are using an additional layer of encryption on top of the described above. See Secret Chats, End-to-End encryption for details.

+
+

MTProto supports Perfect Forward Secrecy in both cloud chats and secret chats.

+
+

Terminology

+

Authorization Key (auth_key)

A 2048-bit key shared by the client device and the server, created upon user registration directly on the client device by exchanging Diffie-Hellman keys, and never transmitted over a network. Each authorization key is user-specific. There is nothing that prevents a user from having several keys (that correspond to “permanent sessions” on different devices), and some of these may be locked forever in the event the device is lost. See also Creating an Authorization Key.

-

Server Key

+

Server Key

A 2048-bit RSA key used by the server digitally to sign its own messages while registration is underway and the authorization key is being generated. The application has a built-in public server key which can be used to verify a signature but cannot be used to sign messages. A private server key is stored on the server and changed very infrequently.

-

Key Identifier (auth_key_id)

+

Key Identifier (auth_key_id)

The 64 lower-order bits of the SHA1 hash of the authorization key are used to indicate which particular key was used to encrypt a message. Keys must be uniquely defined by the 64 lower-order bits of their SHA1, and in the event of a collision, an authorization key is regenerated. A zero key identifier means that encryption is not used which is permissible for a limited set of message types used during registration to generate an authorization key in a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For MTProto 2.0, SHA1 is still used here, because auth_key_id should identify the authorization key used independently of the protocol version.

-

Session

+

Session

A (random) 64-bit number generated by the client to distinguish between individual sessions (for example, between different instances of the application, created with the same authorization key). The session in conjunction with the key identifier corresponds to an application instance. The server can maintain session state. Under no circumstances can a message meant for one session be sent into a different session. The server may unilaterally forget any client sessions; clients should be able to handle this.

-

Server Salt

+

Server Salt

A (random) 64-bit number changed every 30 minutes (separately for each session) at the request of the server. All subsequent messages must contain the new salt (although, messages with the old salt are still accepted for a further 1800 seconds). Required to protect against replay attacks and certain tricks associated with adjusting the client clock to a moment in the distant future.

-

Message Identifier (msg_id)

+

Message Identifier (msg_id)

A (time-dependent) 64-bit number used uniquely to identify a message within a session. Client message identifiers are divisible by 4, server message identifiers modulo 4 yield 1 if the message is a response to a client message, and 3 otherwise. Client message identifiers must increase monotonically (within a single session), the same as server message identifiers, and must approximately equal unixtime*2^32. This way, a message identifier points to the approximate moment in time the message was created. A message is rejected over 300 seconds after it is created or 30 seconds before it is created (this is needed to protect from replay attacks). In this situation, it must be re-sent with a different identifier (or placed in a container with a higher identifier). The identifier of a message container must be strictly greater than those of its nested messages.

Important: to counter replay-attacks the lower 32 bits of msg_id passed by the client must not be empty and must present a fractional part of the time point when the message was created.

-

Content-related Message

+

Content-related Message

A message requiring an explicit acknowledgment. These include all the user and many service messages, virtually all with the exception of containers and acknowledgments.

-

Message Sequence Number (msg_seqno)

+

Message Sequence Number (msg_seqno)

A 32-bit number equal to twice the number of “content-related” messages (those requiring acknowledgment, and in particular those that are not containers) created by the sender prior to this message and subsequently incremented by one if the current message is a content-related message. A container is always generated after its entire contents; therefore, its sequence number is greater than or equal to the sequence numbers of the messages contained in it.

-

Message Key (msg_key)

+

Message Key (msg_key)

In MTProto 2.0, the middle 128 bits of the SHA-256 hash of the message to be encrypted (including the internal header and the padding bytes for MTProto 2.0), prepended by a 32-byte fragment of the authorization key.

In MTProto 1.0, message key was defined differently, as the lower 128 bits of the SHA-1 hash of the message to be encrypted, with padding bytes excluded from the computation of the hash. Authorization key was not involved in this computation.

-

Internal (cryptographic) Header

+

Internal (cryptographic) Header

A header (16 bytes) added before a message or a container before it is all encrypted together. Consists of the server salt (64 bits) and the session (64 bits).

-

External (cryptographic) Header

+

External (cryptographic) Header

A header (24 bytes) added before an encrypted message or a container. Consists of the key identifier auth_key_id (64 bits) and the message key msg_key (128 bits).

-

Payload

+

Payload

External header + encrypted message or container.

-

Defining AES Key and Initialization Vector

+

Defining AES Key and Initialization Vector

The 2048-bit authorization key (auth_key) and the 128-bit message key (msg_key) are used to compute a 256-bit AES key (aes_key) and a 256-bit initialization vector (aes_iv) which are subsequently used to encrypt the part of the message to be encrypted (i. e. everything with the exception of the external header that is added later) with AES-256 in infinite garble extension (IGE) mode.

For MTProto 2.0, the algorithm for computing aes_key and aes_iv from auth_key and msg_key is as follows.

+

During the creation of the authorization key, the client obtains its server salt (to be used with the new key for all communication in the near future). The client then creates an encrypted session using the newly generated key, and subsequent communication occurs within that session (including the transmission of the user's registration information and phone number validation) unless the client creates a new session. The client is free to create new or additional sessions at any time by choosing a new random session_id.

+ diff --git a/data/web/core.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html b/data/web/core.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html index 62800c8e3a..3f45252703 100644 --- a/data/web/core.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html +++ b/data/web/core.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html @@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ MTProto v.1.0 is deprecated and is currently being phased…">
-

As of version 4.6, major Telegram clients are using MTProto 2.0. -MTProto v.1.0 is deprecated and is currently being phased out.

+

As of version 4.6, major Telegram clients are using MTProto 2.0.
MTProto v.1.0 is deprecated and is currently being phased out.

This article describes the basic layer of the MTProto protocol version 2.0 (Cloud chats, server-client encryption). The principal differences from version 1.0 (described here for reference) are as follows:

See also: MTProto 2.0: Secret Chats, end-to-end encryption

-

Protocol description

+

Protocol description

Before a message (or a multipart message) is transmitted over a network using a transport protocol, it is encrypted in a certain way, and an external header is added at the top of the message that consists of a 64-bit key identifier auth_key_id (that uniquely identifies an authorization key for the server as well as the user) and a 128-bit message key msg_key.

The authorization key auth_key combined with the message key msg_key define an actual 256-bit key aes_key and a 256-bit initialization vector aes_iv, which are used to encrypt the message using AES-256 encryption in infinite garble extension (IGE) mode. Note that the initial part of the message to be encrypted contains variable data (session, message ID, sequence number, server salt) that obviously influences the message key (and thus the AES key and iv). In MTProto 2.0, the message key is defined as the 128 middle bits of the SHA-256 of the message body (including session, message ID, padding, etc.) prepended by 32 bytes taken from the authorization key. In the older MTProto 1.0, the message key was computed as the lower 128 bits of SHA-1 of the message body, excluding the padding bytes.

Multipart messages are encrypted as a single message.

- MTProto server-client encryption, cloud chats + MTProto server-client encryption, cloud chats
+

Got questions about this setup? — Check out the Advanced FAQ!

-
Note 1
+
Note 1

Each plaintext message to be encrypted in MTProto always contains the following data to be checked upon decryption in order to make the system robust against known problems with the components:

-
Note 2
-

Telegram's End-to-end encrypted Secret Chats are using an additional layer of encryption on top of the described above. See Secret Chats, End-to-End encryption for details.

-

Terminology

-

Authorization Key (auth_key)

+
Note 2
+

Telegram's End-to-end encrypted Secret Chats are using an additional layer of encryption on top of the described above. See Secret Chats, End-to-End encryption for details.

+
+

MTProto supports Perfect Forward Secrecy in both cloud chats and secret chats.

+
+

Terminology

+

Authorization Key (auth_key)

A 2048-bit key shared by the client device and the server, created upon user registration directly on the client device by exchanging Diffie-Hellman keys, and never transmitted over a network. Each authorization key is user-specific. There is nothing that prevents a user from having several keys (that correspond to “permanent sessions” on different devices), and some of these may be locked forever in the event the device is lost. See also Creating an Authorization Key.

-

Server Key

+

Server Key

A 2048-bit RSA key used by the server digitally to sign its own messages while registration is underway and the authorization key is being generated. The application has a built-in public server key which can be used to verify a signature but cannot be used to sign messages. A private server key is stored on the server and changed very infrequently.

-

Key Identifier (auth_key_id)

+

Key Identifier (auth_key_id)

The 64 lower-order bits of the SHA1 hash of the authorization key are used to indicate which particular key was used to encrypt a message. Keys must be uniquely defined by the 64 lower-order bits of their SHA1, and in the event of a collision, an authorization key is regenerated. A zero key identifier means that encryption is not used which is permissible for a limited set of message types used during registration to generate an authorization key in a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For MTProto 2.0, SHA1 is still used here, because auth_key_id should identify the authorization key used independently of the protocol version.

-

Session

+

Session

A (random) 64-bit number generated by the client to distinguish between individual sessions (for example, between different instances of the application, created with the same authorization key). The session in conjunction with the key identifier corresponds to an application instance. The server can maintain session state. Under no circumstances can a message meant for one session be sent into a different session. The server may unilaterally forget any client sessions; clients should be able to handle this.

-

Server Salt

+

Server Salt

A (random) 64-bit number changed every 30 minutes (separately for each session) at the request of the server. All subsequent messages must contain the new salt (although, messages with the old salt are still accepted for a further 1800 seconds). Required to protect against replay attacks and certain tricks associated with adjusting the client clock to a moment in the distant future.

-

Message Identifier (msg_id)

+

Message Identifier (msg_id)

A (time-dependent) 64-bit number used uniquely to identify a message within a session. Client message identifiers are divisible by 4, server message identifiers modulo 4 yield 1 if the message is a response to a client message, and 3 otherwise. Client message identifiers must increase monotonically (within a single session), the same as server message identifiers, and must approximately equal unixtime*2^32. This way, a message identifier points to the approximate moment in time the message was created. A message is rejected over 300 seconds after it is created or 30 seconds before it is created (this is needed to protect from replay attacks). In this situation, it must be re-sent with a different identifier (or placed in a container with a higher identifier). The identifier of a message container must be strictly greater than those of its nested messages.

Important: to counter replay-attacks the lower 32 bits of msg_id passed by the client must not be empty and must present a fractional part of the time point when the message was created.

-

Content-related Message

+

Content-related Message

A message requiring an explicit acknowledgment. These include all the user and many service messages, virtually all with the exception of containers and acknowledgments.

-

Message Sequence Number (msg_seqno)

+

Message Sequence Number (msg_seqno)

A 32-bit number equal to twice the number of “content-related” messages (those requiring acknowledgment, and in particular those that are not containers) created by the sender prior to this message and subsequently incremented by one if the current message is a content-related message. A container is always generated after its entire contents; therefore, its sequence number is greater than or equal to the sequence numbers of the messages contained in it.

-

Message Key (msg_key)

+

Message Key (msg_key)

In MTProto 2.0, the middle 128 bits of the SHA-256 hash of the message to be encrypted (including the internal header and the padding bytes for MTProto 2.0), prepended by a 32-byte fragment of the authorization key.

In MTProto 1.0, message key was defined differently, as the lower 128 bits of the SHA-1 hash of the message to be encrypted, with padding bytes excluded from the computation of the hash. Authorization key was not involved in this computation.

-

Internal (cryptographic) Header

+

Internal (cryptographic) Header

A header (16 bytes) added before a message or a container before it is all encrypted together. Consists of the server salt (64 bits) and the session (64 bits).

-

External (cryptographic) Header

+

External (cryptographic) Header

A header (24 bytes) added before an encrypted message or a container. Consists of the key identifier auth_key_id (64 bits) and the message key msg_key (128 bits).

-

Payload

+

Payload

External header + encrypted message or container.

-

Defining AES Key and Initialization Vector

+

Defining AES Key and Initialization Vector

The 2048-bit authorization key (auth_key) and the 128-bit message key (msg_key) are used to compute a 256-bit AES key (aes_key) and a 256-bit initialization vector (aes_iv) which are subsequently used to encrypt the part of the message to be encrypted (i. e. everything with the exception of the external header that is added later) with AES-256 in infinite garble extension (IGE) mode.

For MTProto 2.0, the algorithm for computing aes_key and aes_iv from auth_key and msg_key is as follows.

+

During the creation of the authorization key, the client obtains its server salt (to be used with the new key for all communication in the near future). The client then creates an encrypted session using the newly generated key, and subsequent communication occurs within that session (including the transmission of the user's registration information and phone number validation) unless the client creates a new session. The client is free to create new or additional sessions at any time by choosing a new random session_id.

+ diff --git a/data/web/corefork.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html b/data/web/corefork.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html index 1b0fc43c7f..fc2f1d72e9 100644 --- a/data/web/corefork.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html +++ b/data/web/corefork.telegram.org/mtproto/description.html @@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ MTProto v.1.0 is deprecated and is currently being phased…">
-

As of version 4.6, major Telegram clients are using MTProto 2.0. -MTProto v.1.0 is deprecated and is currently being phased out.

+

As of version 4.6, major Telegram clients are using MTProto 2.0.
MTProto v.1.0 is deprecated and is currently being phased out.

This article describes the basic layer of the MTProto protocol version 2.0 (Cloud chats, server-client encryption). The principal differences from version 1.0 (described here for reference) are as follows:

See also: MTProto 2.0: Secret Chats, end-to-end encryption

-

Protocol description

+

Protocol description

Before a message (or a multipart message) is transmitted over a network using a transport protocol, it is encrypted in a certain way, and an external header is added at the top of the message that consists of a 64-bit key identifier auth_key_id (that uniquely identifies an authorization key for the server as well as the user) and a 128-bit message key msg_key.

The authorization key auth_key combined with the message key msg_key define an actual 256-bit key aes_key and a 256-bit initialization vector aes_iv, which are used to encrypt the message using AES-256 encryption in infinite garble extension (IGE) mode. Note that the initial part of the message to be encrypted contains variable data (session, message ID, sequence number, server salt) that obviously influences the message key (and thus the AES key and iv). In MTProto 2.0, the message key is defined as the 128 middle bits of the SHA-256 of the message body (including session, message ID, padding, etc.) prepended by 32 bytes taken from the authorization key. In the older MTProto 1.0, the message key was computed as the lower 128 bits of SHA-1 of the message body, excluding the padding bytes.

Multipart messages are encrypted as a single message.

- MTProto server-client encryption, cloud chats + MTProto server-client encryption, cloud chats
+

Got questions about this setup? — Check out the Advanced FAQ!

-
Note 1
+
Note 1

Each plaintext message to be encrypted in MTProto always contains the following data to be checked upon decryption in order to make the system robust against known problems with the components:

-
Note 2
-

Telegram's End-to-end encrypted Secret Chats are using an additional layer of encryption on top of the described above. See Secret Chats, End-to-End encryption for details.

-

Terminology

-

Authorization Key (auth_key)

+
Note 2
+

Telegram's End-to-end encrypted Secret Chats are using an additional layer of encryption on top of the described above. See Secret Chats, End-to-End encryption for details.

+
+

MTProto supports Perfect Forward Secrecy in both cloud chats and secret chats.

+
+

Terminology

+

Authorization Key (auth_key)

A 2048-bit key shared by the client device and the server, created upon user registration directly on the client device by exchanging Diffie-Hellman keys, and never transmitted over a network. Each authorization key is user-specific. There is nothing that prevents a user from having several keys (that correspond to “permanent sessions” on different devices), and some of these may be locked forever in the event the device is lost. See also Creating an Authorization Key.

-

Server Key

+

Server Key

A 2048-bit RSA key used by the server digitally to sign its own messages while registration is underway and the authorization key is being generated. The application has a built-in public server key which can be used to verify a signature but cannot be used to sign messages. A private server key is stored on the server and changed very infrequently.

-

Key Identifier (auth_key_id)

+

Key Identifier (auth_key_id)

The 64 lower-order bits of the SHA1 hash of the authorization key are used to indicate which particular key was used to encrypt a message. Keys must be uniquely defined by the 64 lower-order bits of their SHA1, and in the event of a collision, an authorization key is regenerated. A zero key identifier means that encryption is not used which is permissible for a limited set of message types used during registration to generate an authorization key in a Diffie-Hellman exchange. For MTProto 2.0, SHA1 is still used here, because auth_key_id should identify the authorization key used independently of the protocol version.

-

Session

+

Session

A (random) 64-bit number generated by the client to distinguish between individual sessions (for example, between different instances of the application, created with the same authorization key). The session in conjunction with the key identifier corresponds to an application instance. The server can maintain session state. Under no circumstances can a message meant for one session be sent into a different session. The server may unilaterally forget any client sessions; clients should be able to handle this.

-

Server Salt

+

Server Salt

A (random) 64-bit number changed every 30 minutes (separately for each session) at the request of the server. All subsequent messages must contain the new salt (although, messages with the old salt are still accepted for a further 1800 seconds). Required to protect against replay attacks and certain tricks associated with adjusting the client clock to a moment in the distant future.

-

Message Identifier (msg_id)

+

Message Identifier (msg_id)

A (time-dependent) 64-bit number used uniquely to identify a message within a session. Client message identifiers are divisible by 4, server message identifiers modulo 4 yield 1 if the message is a response to a client message, and 3 otherwise. Client message identifiers must increase monotonically (within a single session), the same as server message identifiers, and must approximately equal unixtime*2^32. This way, a message identifier points to the approximate moment in time the message was created. A message is rejected over 300 seconds after it is created or 30 seconds before it is created (this is needed to protect from replay attacks). In this situation, it must be re-sent with a different identifier (or placed in a container with a higher identifier). The identifier of a message container must be strictly greater than those of its nested messages.

Important: to counter replay-attacks the lower 32 bits of msg_id passed by the client must not be empty and must present a fractional part of the time point when the message was created.

-

Content-related Message

+

Content-related Message

A message requiring an explicit acknowledgment. These include all the user and many service messages, virtually all with the exception of containers and acknowledgments.

-

Message Sequence Number (msg_seqno)

+

Message Sequence Number (msg_seqno)

A 32-bit number equal to twice the number of “content-related” messages (those requiring acknowledgment, and in particular those that are not containers) created by the sender prior to this message and subsequently incremented by one if the current message is a content-related message. A container is always generated after its entire contents; therefore, its sequence number is greater than or equal to the sequence numbers of the messages contained in it.

-

Message Key (msg_key)

+

Message Key (msg_key)

In MTProto 2.0, the middle 128 bits of the SHA-256 hash of the message to be encrypted (including the internal header and the padding bytes for MTProto 2.0), prepended by a 32-byte fragment of the authorization key.

In MTProto 1.0, message key was defined differently, as the lower 128 bits of the SHA-1 hash of the message to be encrypted, with padding bytes excluded from the computation of the hash. Authorization key was not involved in this computation.

-

Internal (cryptographic) Header

+

Internal (cryptographic) Header

A header (16 bytes) added before a message or a container before it is all encrypted together. Consists of the server salt (64 bits) and the session (64 bits).

-

External (cryptographic) Header

+

External (cryptographic) Header

A header (24 bytes) added before an encrypted message or a container. Consists of the key identifier auth_key_id (64 bits) and the message key msg_key (128 bits).

-

Payload

+

Payload

External header + encrypted message or container.

-

Defining AES Key and Initialization Vector

+

Defining AES Key and Initialization Vector

The 2048-bit authorization key (auth_key) and the 128-bit message key (msg_key) are used to compute a 256-bit AES key (aes_key) and a 256-bit initialization vector (aes_iv) which are subsequently used to encrypt the part of the message to be encrypted (i. e. everything with the exception of the external header that is added later) with AES-256 in infinite garble extension (IGE) mode.

For MTProto 2.0, the algorithm for computing aes_key and aes_iv from auth_key and msg_key is as follows.

+

During the creation of the authorization key, the client obtains its server salt (to be used with the new key for all communication in the near future). The client then creates an encrypted session using the newly generated key, and subsequent communication occurs within that session (including the transmission of the user's registration information and phone number validation) unless the client creates a new session. The client is free to create new or additional sessions at any time by choosing a new random session_id.

+